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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an Appeal from an Order and Judgment signed and
entered by the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Third Judicial District
Court on April 30, 1990, wherein the Appellant's Petition to Modify
was denied and Appellant's requested judgment for one-half of the
net income of the Appellee for the years 1981 through 1989 was
denied.

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1953).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by

denying Appellant's request that alimony be reduced or terminated
based upon a substantial change in Appellee's circumstances and
Appellee's ability to earn income?
2.

Whether the trial court erred in not attributing to

Appellee a net income equal to $1,600 per month (the earnings
before Appellee voluntarily became a real estate salesperson) in
modifying and/or decreasing alimony?
3.

.Whether the trial court erred by holding that

Appellant's failure to discover the Appellee's true earnings and
Appellant's failure to assert his right to reduce his alimony
payments by one-half of Appellee's earnings constituted a waiver of
Appellant's right to reduce his alimony payments, in accordance
with the Decree of Divorce, which has not been modified?
4.

Whether the trial court erred

in holding that

Appellant was estopped to assert his right for a judgment against

1

Appellee for one-half of her net earnings of approximately $55,000
from 1981 through 1989?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The

applicable

standard

of

review

for

all

issues

presented on appeal is succinctly stated in Hunter v. Hunter, 669
P.2d 430 (Utah 1983), wherein the court declared:
While it is true in equity cases this Court
may review questions of both law and fact we
are not bound to substitute our judgment for
that of the trial court, and because of its
advantaged position we give considerable
deference to its findings and judgment.
Id. at 431.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made
not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court may amend its findings or make
additional findings and may amend the judgment
accordingly. The motion may be made with a
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59.
When findings of fact are made in action tried
by the court without a jury, the question of
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
findings may thereafter be raised whethesr or
not the party raising the question has made in
the district court an objection to such
findings or has made either a motion to amend
them, a motion for judgment, or amotion for a
new trial.

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1953).
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to
make subsequent changes or new orders for the
support and maintenance of the parties, the
custody of the children and their support,
maintenance, health, and dental care, or the
distribution of the property as is reasonable
and necessary.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Proceedings Below,
Appellant Howard Hinckley (hereinafter -Howard-) filed a

petition to reduce or terminate alimony in March 1989.

Appellee

Charlene Hinckley (hereinafter "Charlene") subsequently filed an
Answer and Counterclaim.
without

The case was tried by the court sitting

a jury on March 21, 1990.

The court rendered its

Memorandum Decision on April 13, 1990, denying Howard's Petition
and Charlene's Counterclaim.

The court found that Howard had

waived his right to reduce his alimony payments by one-half of
Charleners net earnings for the years 1981 through 1989, and was
estopped from now asserting his right and obtaining judgment
against Charlene in that amount.

The court awarded Charlene

judgment against Howard for unpaid alimony in the sum of $6,000.00.
The court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Judgment on April 30, 1990. Howard filed an Objection to Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure

52(b),

moving

accordingly, on April

the

court

30, 1990.

to

amend

the

Judgment

An Order denying

Howard's

Objection was signed and entered on May 25, 1990.
2.

Statement of Facts.
Charlene was granted a Decree of Divorce from Howard on

November 20, 1980. (R. 65). The Decree provides that Howard shall
pay to Charlene alimony in the amount of $1,200 per month. (R. 62).
The Decree further provides that the amount of alimony due from
Howard to Charlene "shall be reduced by one-half of the net amount
3

of [Charlene#s] net income earned and received from her employment,
if any. •• (R. 62) .
Howard filed a petition to reduce or terminate alimony on
March 10, 1989, based upon his belief that Charlene was gainfully
employed and that Charlene had failed to inform Howard of her
income. (R. 92).

Howard continued to make the alimony payments

until November, 1989, at which time he discontinued

alimony

payments based upon his discovery that Charlene had net earnings in
excess of

$50,000, of which she had refused to advise him.

(Transcript 119).
For the years

1981 through

1988, Charlene

had net

earnings in excess of $55,000, as verified by her response to
Interrogatories, (Defendant's Trial Exhibit 1 ) , her employment
record, (Defendant's Trial Exhibit 2 ) , her federal income tax
returns for the years 1986, 1987 and 1988, (Defendant's Trial
Exhibits 3, 4, & 5) and her testimony at trial (Transcript 13-16,
35-36).
All of Howard's income is reflected accurately in his tax
returns (R. 71). Howard's 1979 federal income tax return reflects
total income of $34,852 (Defendant's Trial Exhibit 12). Howard's
1986 federal income tax return reflects total income of $15,120
(Defendant's Trial Exhibit 13). Howard's 1987 federal income tax
return reflects total income of $21,244 (Defendant's Trial Exhibit
14). Howard's 1988 federal income tax return reflects total income
of $23,186 (Defendant's Trial Exhibit 15). Howard testified that
his gross business income for 1989 was approximately $102,000,
4

$8,996 more than in 1988 (Transcript 88-89), while his business
expenses remained approximately the same (Transcript 62). Adding
$8,996 to Howard's gross personal income of $23,186 for 1988
(Defendant's Trial Exhibit 15) based upon the testimony that the
business expenses were approximately the same for 1989 as they were
for 1988 (Transcript 62), and deducting alimony of $12,000 from
Howard's gross personal income for 1989, Howard's net personal
income for 1989 was approximately $20,182 - less than his net
personal income at the time of the divorce.

(Defendant's Trial

Exhibit 15; Transcript 62, 88-89).
The Record reflects the following substantial changes in
the relative circumstances of the parties:
1.
and

expressed

Howard was 66-1/2 years old at the time of trial,
a desire to retire.

(Transcript

63).

Howard

testified that he wanted to sell his apartments to reduce his
responsibilities
barbershops.

and stress and that he might also sell his

(Transcript 63-64).

Howard further testified that

his personal earning capacity had diminished, that he could not
keep up his apartments himself and that he could not cut hair as
much as he used to.

(Transcript 87). Howard's net personal income

for 1989 was approximately $20,182, less than his net personal
income at the time of the divorce.

(Defendant's Trial Exhibit 15;

Transcript 62, 88-89).
2.

At the time of the divorce, when she was responsible

for the care and maintenance of the parties' two teenage children,
Charlene claimed monthly expenses of $2,267.45. (Plaintiff's Trial
5

Exhibit 1).

The children of the parties are now emancipated,

leaving

Charlene

the

with

no

time

commitment

or

financial

obligation to dependent children. She now claims monthly expenses
of $2,621.59 for just herself.
3.

(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 21).

Charlene still lives in the marital home and has

done substantial remodeling to the home, improving and enlarging
the

living

area

significantly

and

increasing

considerably. (Transcript 39-40, 135-136).

the

value

At the time of the

divorce, the balance on the mortgage was $9,300.00 (Plaintiff's
Trial Exhibit 2 ) , with a monthly payment, including taxes and
insurance, of $285.59.

(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 1). Charlene

refinanced the home to pay for the remodeling and now has a monthly
payment in excess of $500.00.

(Transcript 40).

Charlene makes

these monthly payments from the proceeds of the sale of the duplex
awarded her in the Decree.
4.

(Transcript 41).

Howard lives in a $225.00 per month apartment, which

living accommodations are far less than when he lived in the home
of the parties.

(Transcript 164, 136).

At the time of the

divorce, Howard claimed monthly living expenses of $1,282.00.
(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 2).
of $1,767.00.
5.

He now has monthly living expenses

(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 6).
Charlene did not work

outside the home during

parties' marriage, although she has had a realtor's license since
1971 or 1972.

(Transcript 44).

the home as a real estate agent.

Charlene is now employed outside
(Transcript 18).

Charlene drives

a 1988 Honda, which she leases for $250.00 a month for use in her
6

business, enabling her to expense the lease payments. (Transcript
161) .
6.

Prior to her decision to pursue a career as a real

estate agent, Charlene was employed at State Mutual Insurance,
earning wages of $16,393.00 in 1986, as reflected on her 1986
federal income tax return.

(Defendant's Trial Exhibit 5 ) . This

income, combined with interest income and rents received, and
exclusive of alimony, gave her a gross income in excess of $21,000
for the year 1986. (Defendant's Trial Exhibit 5 ) .
The trial court made no findings regarding Charlene's
past or current earnings or Charlene's past or current ability to
support herself in her accustomed standard of living, (R. 397,
401), but instead focused his inquiry upon whether Howard could
afford to continue paying alimony to Charlene.

(R. 397, 401-402).

Transcript 56-57). The court declined to hear evidence regarding
Charlene's standard of living and her ability to support herself.
The court made no finding that Charlene was unable to
obtain employment, and in fact, the record shows that she is
currently employed as a real estate sales person and that she has
been almost continuously employed since the parties' divorce.
(Transcript 12-18).
The court made no findings regarding Charlene's standard
of living.

Charlene testified that she did not buy on credit

during her marriage, but waited until she could pay cash to make
her purchases.

(Transcript 139). She further testified that she

still buys the things she wants, but now buys them on credit rather
7

than with cash.

(Transcript 139). Her Financial Declaration shows

that she has not hesitated to incur debts to improve her lifestyle,
showing a balance of $45,156.49 on the loan to remodel and enlarge
her home, a balance of $1,319.47 on her Visa, and a balance of
$869.64 on her ZCMI account at the time of trial.
Trial Exhibit 21).

(Plaintiff's

It is curious to note that, while Charlene has

claimed monthly expenses of $2,621.59, she has declared income of
only $1,869.54.

(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 21).

This discrepancy

was not addressed by the court.
Also not addressed by the court is the fact that Charlene
has retained counsel in Texas and had paid retainers to two
separate attorneys in the amount of $3,000 as of January 1989.
(Defendant's Trial Exhibit 11, p.5). The court failed to determine
if this expense was included in Charlene's statement of living
expenses and where Charlene obtained the money to pay these
retainers.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion by denying Howard's
request to reduce or terminate alimony, even though the record
reflects a substantial change in the relative circumstances of the
parties.

The court failed to make a finding regarding Charlene's

standard of living and her ability to earn income. The court also
failed to address Howard's age and decrease in his income.

The

trial court erred in not attributing to Charlene a net income equal
to $1,600 per month, the amount she was earning at the time she
voluntarily became a real estate salesperson, a career which
8

conveniently yields no net income, in making a determination
regarding modification or termination of alimony•
The trial court further erred by holding that Howard's
failure to discover Charlene's true earnings and Howard's failure
to assert his right to reduce his alimony payments by one-half of
Charlene's earnings constituted a waiver of Howard's right to
reduce his alimony payments in accordance with the Decree of
Divorce.

Howard's actions or failure to act do not meet these

criteria for a waiver.

Furthermore, the record does not reflect

any affirmative act or conduct on Howard's part which supports the
court's finding of estoppel.

The trial court further erred in

holding that Howard waived his right to a judgment against Charlene
for one-half of her net earnings from 1981 through 1989.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING
HOWARD'S REQUEST TO REDUCE OR TERMINATE ALIMONY.
"Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining
the amount of alimony appropriate in a given case, and will be
upheld unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is
shown."

Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah App.

1990)(citing Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 103 (Utah 1986));
Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 161 (Utah App. 1989)).

In the

case at bar, the trial court has clearly abused its discretion by
denying Howard's request to reduce or terminate alimony, even
though the record reflects a substantial change in Charlene's

9

circumstances, and by failing to make any findings regarding
Charlene's standard of living and her ability to support herself.
A.

The Record Reflects a Substantial Change in
Circumstances Warranting Modification of the
Divorce Decree.

Section 30-3-5(3), Utah Code Ann. (1953) provides that
the district court has continuing jurisdiction in divorce cases "to
make such subsequent changes or new orders with respect to the
support and maintenance of the parties ... as shall be reasonable
and necessary."

Utah courts have construed this statute to

"empower the court to make a modification where there has been a
substantial change in the material circumstances of either one or
both of the parties since the decree was entered."

Sorensen v.

Sorensen, 20 Utah 2d 360, 361, 438 P.2d 180, 181 (1968)(emphasis
added).
The policy underlying the requirement of a substantial
change in circumstances is stated in Haslam v. Haslam, 647 P.2d 757
(Utah 1983), wherein the court declared:
To provide some stability to decrees, however
and to prevent the inundation of the courts
with petitions for modification, a party
seeking a modification must demonstrate a
substantial changes of circumstances. E.g. ,
Adams v. Adams, Utah, 593 P.2d 147 (1979).
Id. at 758.
In Haslam, the

former husband

filed

a petition to

terminate alimony based upon the fact that the former wife had
obtained employment and had increased her income, while the former
husband had retired and received in income approximately the same
amount as at the time of the divorce. At the time of the divorce,
10

the former husband earned between $1,000.00 and $1,200.00 per
month, while the former wife was unemployed.

Subsequent to the

divorce, the former wife became employed, earning $1,100.00 per
month, and supplemented her income with interest from a savings
account, while the former husband retired and drew approximately
the same income as he had at the time of the divorce. Id. at 758.
The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that the
former husband had not shown a sufficient change of circumstances.
Id, at 758.
reinstated

The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court,
the

petition

and

remanded

the

case

for

further

proceedings to modify the decree, stating:
On the instant facts it is clear that there
has
been
a
substantial
change
in
circumstances. Since the divorce, the former
Mrs.
Haslam
has
obtained
employment,
experienced a substantial increase in income
and has accumulated some savings. Mr. Haslam
has retired and presently receives income in
approximately the same amount as he received
at the time of the divorce some seventeen
years ago.
Under the circumstances of his case, we think
that the combination of the supporting
spouses'
retirement, together
with
the
dependent spouse's employment, earning of a
substantial income, and accumulation of
substantial savings subsequent to the original
divorce decree, constitutes a substantial
change of circumstances.
Id. at 758.
Similarly, in Jeppson v. Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69 (Utah
1984), the trial court ordered termination of alimony for the
former wife based upon the facts that the parties' child no longer
resided with the former wife and she provided no support for the
11

child, the former wife had income producing assets, and the foanner
wife had the ability to perform some work, while the income of the
former husband had increased only marginally.

In affirming the

trial court's ruling the Utah Supreme Court held:
A relative change in the income and expenses
of the parties, if comparatively significant,
can amount to ci substantial change in
circumstances.
(Citations omitted).
The
facts of this case support the trial court's
finding
of
a
substantial
change
in
circumstances.
Id. at 70 (emphasis added).
In Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbauqh, 786 P.2d 241 (Utah App.
1990), even though the former husband conceded that he had the
ability

to continue paying

alimony, the trial

court granted

termination of alimony based upon the facts that 1) the parties'
children were emancipated, and 2) while the former wife was
unemployed during the parties' marriage and had no income from
outside sources, she had subsequently obtained a Master's degree in
social work and had become employed with a salary in 1987 of
$16,203.77 and had acquired income-producing assets.

Id. at 242.

This court upheld the ruling of the trial court, stating:
In this case, defendant conceded that he had
the economic ability to continue paying
alimony. Therefore, the question before us is
whether there was a sufficient material change
in
plaintiff
circumstances
to
justify
termination of alimony. At the time of the
divorce, the parties had a family income of
about $30,000 per year, consisting solely of
defendant's salary, to provide for a family of
four. In contrast, by the time of the hearing
on
the
petition
for
modification,
approximately
twenty-two
years
later,
plaintiff had income from salary and other
sources of approximately $22,000 per yecir, to
12

support
herself
only.
She also had
accumulated substantial assets. We find no
abuse of discretion in the trial court's
finding that this constituted a substantial
change in circumstances.
Id. at 242-43 (emphasis added).

It is important to note that the

former husband in Bridenbaugh, had increased his salary by eight
times the amount he had been earning at the time of the divorce and
had increased his net worth to $2.5 million. The court found that
the former husband was fully able to pay alimony, but terminated
the alimony anyway, based upon the ability of the former wife to
support herself.

Id. at 242-43.

Additionally, in Sorensen, supra, the court outlined
specific considerations for determining whether a modification is
warranted, stating:
The fact that the wife owns property which has
increased substantially in value or ability to
produce income after the entry of the decree
for alimony is an important consideration, as
is the fact that a child whom the wife has
been supporting has married and has become
employed and self-supporting.
20 Utah 2d at 361, 438 P.2d at 181.
In the case at bar, Charlene has obtained employment and
had increased her income, while Howard wishes to retire and
currently receives in income less than he received at the time of
the divorce. The parties' children no longer reside with Charlene,
she provides no support for the children, and Dayna Hinckley
Atherley has married and has become employed and self-supporting.
Charlene was unemployed during the parties' marriage and had no
income from outside sources.

She has subsequently decided to
13

utilize the realtor's license she has had since 1971 or 1972.
Prior to her career choice, Charlene was employed with a salary in
1986 of $16,393.00, which income, combined with interest income and
rents received, and exclusive of alimony, gave her a gross income
in excess of $21,000.

Charlene currently has income producing

assets as well as the ability to perform work, as evidenced by her
present

employment.

Charlene's

home

has

also

increased

substantially in value since the entry of the decree.

Charlene's

circumstances have changed substantially, warranting termination or
reduction of alimony paid to her by Howard.
B.

The Trial Court Failed to Make Any Findings
Regarding Charlene's Standard of Living and
Charlene's Ability to Provide For Herself.

A trial court must consider three factors in
setting a reasonable award of alimony: 1) the
financial conditions
and needs of the
receiving spouse; 2) the ability of the
receiving spouse to produce a sufficient
income for him or herself: and 3) the ability
of the responding spouse to provide support.
Throckmorton

v.

Throckmorton,

1988)(emphasis added).

767

P.2d

121, 124

(Utah App.

In the case at bar, the trial court made

findings regarding only one* of the three factors outlined in
Throckmorton: the ability of the responding spouse, Howard, to
continue paying support.

There is no evidence in the record to

indicate that the trial court even considered the other two
factors.

In fact, the record reflects that the court deliberately

failed to consider Charlene's financial condition and ability to
produce income:

14

MR.
de
JONGE:
Well,
your
honor,
unfortunately, the issue here is the standard
of living. ...
THE COURT: Not necessarily. The issue, as I
see it, is material change of circumstances.
MR. de JONGE:
Well, material change in
circumstances, but, by the same token, your
Honor, Mrs. Hinckley is entitled to a standard
of living consistent to what she had at the
time of the divorce, and I think the Court
needs to be aware of the fact that she simply
isn't capable of providing that standard of
living on her own.
THE COURT: She is not being asked to do it.
Well, maybe she is.
MR. BROWN:

She is.

MR. de JONGE:

That's what has been alleged.

THE COURT: Well, that's not a real issue in
the mind of the Court, though. I don't think
you need to dwell on whether or not I am going
to cut her alimony entirely.
I think the
issue is whether or not Mr. Hinckley's income
has been depleted to the point to where he
cannot afford to pay what he is paying.
(Transcript 56-57)(emphasis added). With regard to such a failure,
the Throckmorton court held:
[I]t is reversible error if a trial court
fails to make findings on all material issues
unless the facts in the record are "'clear,
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only
a finding in favor of the judgment.'"
(Citations omitted.)
Utah courts have consistently found an abuse
of discretion in setting alimony when the
trial court failed to make findings on the
financial conditions
and needs of the
receiving spouse. See e.g., Higley v. Higley,
676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983)(remanded since
the trial court made no findings with regard
to receiving spouse's ability to work); Ruhsam
v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah Ct. App.
1987)(trial court failed to adequately address
15

the financial needs of the claimant spouse,,
making it necessary for the reviewing court to
remand the issue for further findings).
Id. at 124 (emphasis added).
These requirements were also discussed by this Court in
Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1988), wherein the
court stated:
In exercising its discretion in determining
the amount of alimony to be awarded, the trial
court must consider the financial condition
and needs of the spouse claiming support, the
ability of that spouse to provide sufficient
income for him or herself, and the ability of
the responding spouse to provide the support.
Paffel, 732 P.2d [96] at 101 [(Utah 1986)].
Failure to consider these factors constitutes
an abuse of discretion. . . .
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that
the trial court must make findings on all
material issues. Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d
996 (Utah 1987). These findings "should be
sufficiently detailed and include enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual
issue was reached."
:id. at 999 (quoting
Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah
1979)) .

The findings of fact made by the trial court
do not specifically set forth appellant's
financial condition and need for support,
including her earning capacity or respondent's
income and ability to pay. Such a failure to
address the Paffel factors explicitly in the
findings of fact requires remand to the trial
court. Gardner fv. Gardner], 748 P.2d [1076]
at 1082 [(Utah 1988)].
Stevens, 754 P.2d at 958.
In the case at bar, the court failed to make any findings
on the material issues of Charlene's standard of living and her
16

ability to support herself in accordance with the standard of
living she enjoyed during the parties' marriage.

Such failure

constitutes reversible error.
The court's failure to make appropriate findings has
resulted in an inappropriate denial of Howard's petition to reduce
or terminate alimony.

In Bridenbauqh, this court held:

The appropriate test to determine whether [a]
termination in alimony [is] appropriate is
whether [Appellee] is now able to provide for
herself a standard of living which is equal to
that enjoyed during the marriage of the
parties.
Bridenbauqh, 786 P.2d at 243.

Because the trial court failed to

make any findings regarding Charlene's standard of living and her
ability to support herself, it is clear that the court failed to
apply the Bridenbauqh test.
In considering Howard's petition, the trial court failed
to consider the fundamental purpose of alimony, which is "to enable
the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the standard
of living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the spouse
from becoming a public charge." Eames v. Eames, 735 P2d. 395, 397
(Utah App. 1987) (citing Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100-01
(Utah 1986));

Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 124.
[T]he purpose of alimony is to allow
the recipient spouse a standard of
living as close as possible to that
experienced during the marriage, not
to keep pace with the payor spouse.

Bridenbauqh, 786 P.2d at 242 (emphasis added).

The evidence shows

that the Charlene is living far above the standard of living
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enjoyed by the parties during their marriage. Howard should not be
compelled to support Charlene in her current improved lifestyle.
POINT II
HOWARD'S FAILURE TO DISCOVER CHARLENE'S TRUE EARNINGS
AND FAILURE TO ASSERT HIS RIGHT TO REDUCE HIS
ALIMONY PAYMENTS BY ONE-HALF OF CHARLENE"S EARNINGS
DO NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OR ESTOPPEL.
The trial court found that Howard had waived his right to
reduce his alimony payments by one-half of Charlene's net earnings
for the years 1981 through 1989, and was estopped from asserting
his rights and obtaining judgment in that amount.

The Supreme

Court of Utah discussed the doctrines of waiver and estoppel in
Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983), stating:
The common element of the doctrines of waiver
and estoppel is the requirement of action or
conduct by the person against whom the
doctrines are asserted.
Id. at 432.

In the case at bar, there has been no action or

conduct by Howard which meets the criteria for waiver or estoppel.
A.

Howard Has Not Waived His Right to Reduce His
Alimony Payments by One-Half of Charlene's Net
Income From Her Employment.

In Hunter, the Court clearly stated the r€*quirements for
waiver as follows:
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of
a known right. To constitute a waiver, there
must be an existing right, benefit or
advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and
an intention to relinquish it.
It must be
distinctly made, although it may be express or
implied. (Citations omitted.) To constitute
a waiver, one's actions or conduct must be
distinctly
made, must
evince
in
some
unequivocal manner an intent to waive, and
must be inconsistent with any other intent.
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Hunter, 669 P.2d at 432 (emphasis added).
In Hunter, the custodial parent had failed to bring an
action to enforce the child support obligations of the noncustodial parent for nine years.

The custodial parent had gone

into hiding shortly after the decree was entered and had not made
any effort to collect the child support payments. The trial court
found that the custodial parent had waived her right to enforce the
support obligation.

The Supreme Court of Utah reversed the

judgment of the trial court and remanded the case with instructions
to enter judgment for the full amount of child support claimed,
stating:
[T]he appellant's inaction is insufficient to
support a finding of waiver or estoppel. The
appellant's action does not unequivocally
evince an intent to waive her right to the
accrued child support.
Id. at 432-33 (emphasis added).
Charlene herself testified that at no time did she
provide Howard with any information regarding her net earnings, as
follows:
Q.
Isn't it true that you would historically
go to Mr. Hinckley's place of business and
pick up the check, either personally or send
one of your children to pick up the check?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

You did that every month, didn't you?

A.

That's right.

Q.

Or your children?

A.

Yes.
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Q.
Most frequently you
children; is that correct?
A.

would

send

your

No, most frequemtly I did it.

Q.
At any time that you came to Mr.
Hinckley's shop to pick up the check, did you
say, "By the way, Mr. Hinckley
I am now
working and this is my monthly income and your
payments should be reduced by whatever"?
A.

No. I never said that.

(Transcript 10, 15)(emphasis added).
Later in her testimony, Charlene further stated:
Q.
Now, Ms. Hinckley, during most of this
period of time, as you were working for
Guardian Life, did you tell Mr. Hinckley, "By
the way, Mr. Hinckley," on the monthly pickup
of the checks, "I am now working and it should
be reduced by one-half of this amount"?
A.

No.

(Transcript 16-17)(emphasis added).
With regard to her income tax information, she testified:
Q.
Prior
to
the
responses
to
the
interrogatories which is Exhibit No. 1, have
you ever furnished Mr. Hinckley with any tax
returns?
A.

No, sir.

(Transcript 18).
request

for

such

Charlene testified that she had received a
information

from

former

counsel

(Defendant's Exhibit 6 ) , but had failed to respond.

in

1989

(Transcript

19).
With regard to her earnings in 1989, Charlene testified:
Q.

Did you receive any money in 1989?

A.

Yes, sir.
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Q.

What did you receive?

A.

About $4,200.

Q.
Did you tell Mr. Hinckley about that
$4,200?
A.

No.

(Tiranscript 36).
Further, in her affidavit of June 14, 1989, Charlene
stated:
d.
Because defendant and I have maintained
constant contact with each other since the
divorce (more than several times a week over
the past eight years) and although we see each
other often, the issue of my employment and
income, or my obligation to repay him a
portion thereof, has never come up between us.
(R. 125).
Howard

testified

that

he

had

repeatedly

asked

for

information regarding Charlene's net earnings, but never received
such information until this action was commenced:
Q.
Now, Mr. Hinckley, have you made requests
from time to time to your wife for an
accounting of her earnings to have the alimony
be offset by 50 per cent, as per the court
order?
A.
It's been some years since I have made a
request.
Most the time when I did make
requests was the few years after we were
divorced. And if I ever did ask her, try to
find out, it just so happens that she wasn't
working or she might have been between jobs,
and I didn't know how to handle it. I knew
that she was but I just let it go.
Q.

All right. Did you tend to forgive that?

A.
Not necessarily.
I think I had an
awesome responsibility of cutting 400 heads of
hair a week to pay that alimony.
I could
never forget it.
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(Transcript 62-63).
He later testified:
Q.
And did you understand at the time —
what did you understand at the time the order
was entered relative to alimony?
A.
Well, it is my understanding I was to pay
$1,200 a month, get Charlene — if she worked
she was to deduct 50 per cent of whatever her
net earnings were.
Q.
At some point in time did you discover
that there had been substantial net earnings?

A.
Well, it's bcien quite a time to find
these net earnings, but it's just been within
the last year that I have been able to find
those net earnings, because it was kind of a
secret.
(Transcript 118-119).
It was not Howard's intention to forgive the 50% offset
provided for by the Decree.

(Transcript 63).

Dayna Atherley

testified at trial regarding a conversation with Howard in 1985:
Q.
You had an occasion, then, to go to your
father's shop to pick up the check?
A.

Yes.

Q.
And did you hcive a conversation with your
father at that time?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

And what essentially did you talk about?

A.
The child support was supposed to be in a
check.
Q.
So you asked him for a check for $1,400
at that time?
A.

Yes, I did.
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Q.

And how much did he write the check for?

A.

$1,200.

Q.
And did you make an inquiry as to why the
check was only $1,200?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

And what was his response to that?

A.
He said that my mother owed him money
because she was working, and so he guessed
they were basically even.
(Transcript 130-131).
Howard also testified regarding the conversation in 1985:
Q.
Drawing your attention to the testimony
by Dana [sic] that was heard earlier today
about the conversation, I suppose sometime in
1985, I'm going to say close to Brent's 21st
birthday, okay?
You heard that testimony,
sir?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And do you recall such a conversation?

A.

Yes.

Q.
Do you recall a conversation at that
time?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Would you tell us what that conversation was?

A.
Well, I asked Dana [sic] if she was
working at the time and she said no.
THE COURT:

You asked Dana [sic] if her mother was

THE WITNESS:

Yes.

working?

(Transcript 163-164).
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In the case at bar, Howard has a right to reduce alimony
payments to Charlene in the amount of one-half of her net income
from her employment.

Howard testified that he never intended to

forgive the 50% offset. He further testified that he had inquired
regarding Charlene's income on numerous occasions, but was never
able to discover the amount of her income.

Charlene's failure to

give Howard any information regarding her net income is clearly
shown by her sworn testimony and admissions.

Dayna Atherley

testified of an occasion when she claimed Howard had reduced the
alimony check by $200.00 basesd upon his belief that Charlene had
earnings from employee.

Howard disputed this testimony, but if

such a conversation took place, it would clearly show that Howard
did intend to enforce the 50% offset for some period of time.

It

is not clear from Dayna's testimony exactly what period of time
Howard intended the alleged 1985 offset to cover, but Dayna's
testimony certainly does not evidence any intent on Howard's part
to completely relinquish his right of offset forever.
The record reveals no distinct actions or conduct on
Howard's part which unequivocally evidence any intent to waive his
right of offset.

There is no evidence in the record that Howard

ever told Charlene that he did not intend to enforce his right.
Howard's

inability

to

obtciin

reliable

information

regarding

Charlene's income, coupled with his failure to enforce his rights
based upon that inability, do not unequivocally evince an intention
to relinquish his right to offset Charlene's income against his
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alimony payments. The facts of this case do not support the trial
court's finding of a waiver on the part of the Howard.
B.

Howard's Failure to Assert His Right
to Reduce the Alimony Payment by One-Half
of Charlene's Net Income Does Not Support
A Finding of Estoppel.

The

Hunter

court

also

outlined

the

criteria

for

application of the doctrine of estoppel, stating:
Estoppel ...
parties from
their actions
to allow them

is a doctrine which precludes
asserting their rights where
or conduct render it inequitable
to assert those rights.
. . .

The doctrine of estoppel has application when
one, by his acts, representations, or conduct,
or by his silence when he ought to speak,
induces another to believe certain facts exist
and such other relies thereon to his
detriment.
Hunter, 669 P.2d at 432.

These criteria were not met in the

instant case.
1.

Howard's Failure to Press the Issue
of his Right of Offset Does Not Support
the Trial Court's Finding of Estoppel.

The Hunter court found that the appellant had no duty to
request child support payments and held that "a finding of estoppel
by the trial court based only on the appellant's silence and
failure to act was in error."

Hunter, 669 P.2d at 433 (citing

French v. Johnson, 16 Utah 2d 360, 401 P.2d 315 (1965)).
In French, supra, the appellant brought an action seeking
to recover 106 months' delinquent monthly child support payments.
The trial court relieved the appellee of the past payments because
the

appellant

had

been

dilatory
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in

requesting

payments

and

producing her forwarding addresses to the appellee.

The Utah

Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court, stating:
The facts show no representations, either
explicit or implicit, by plaintiff
to
defendant with respect to discontinuation of
payments, and it is doubtful if such
circumstance would be of prime importance.
Mere silence over a period of time will not
raise an estoppel where there is no legal or
moral duty to speak.
The court did not
condition the payments upon a request for such
by rappellant!.
Id. at 315-16.
In Adams v. Adams, 593 P. 2d

147

(Utah

1979), the

appellant sought a judgment for five and one-half years' unpaid
alimony.

The trial court found that:
[T]he [appellant] knew or should have known
that the [appellee] did not recognize a duty
to pay alimony, since he had paid none; that
[appellant] had a duty to inform defendant
that she claimed alimony, and that by her
silence for five and on-half years she was
estopped
from
claiming
alimony
against
[appellee].

Id. at 148.
The Utah Supreme court reversed the decision of the trial
court and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in
favor of the appellant for the entire amount of unpaid alimony,
stating:
Mere silence on the part of [appellant] is not
sufficient to raise an estoppel and we find
nothing in the record to support the Court's
finding that she had a duty to speak.
Id. at 148.
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While the facts of the instant case differ somewhat from
the cases cited above, the legal principals applied in the above
cases are readily susceptible to application to the case at bar.
In the case at bar, the court did not condition the
reduction of alimony payments by one-half of the Charlene's net
income

upon

a

request

Charlene's net income.

by

Howard

for

information

regarding

Howard was entitled by the terms of the

decree to expect that information regarding Charlene's net income
would be provided to him so that he could enforce the terms of the
decree. The decree did not confer upon Howard a duty to speak, but
rather conferred such a duty upon the Charlene.
Even in the absence of a duty to speak on his part, that
he had asked for information regarding Charlene's net income on
numerous occasions and had been told that she was not working or
was between jobs.

Charlene testified herself that she never

provided Howard with information regarding her income. The record
does not indicate that Howard at any time personally indicated to
Charlene that he did not intend to enforce the provision of the
decree.
2.

There is No Evidence in the Record That
Charlene Justifiably Relied Upon Any
Affirmative Act of Howard to Her Detriment.

A crucial element of estoppel is a detrimental change in
position based upon the representations or action of the party
charged.

See, e.g. , Adams, 593 P.2d at 148. There is no evidence

in the record that Appellee relied upon any representation or
action of Howard to her detriment.
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As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Baggs v. Anderson,
528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974):
This requirement is not satisfied by the mere
fact that [Appellee] indulged in the pleasant
and euphoric assumption that he would not have
to meet his obligations and that he bought a
more expensive car and moved to a more
expensive apartment.
Likewise, the mere
passage of time, or the failure of a creditor
[(Appellant]) to bedevil the debtor for
payment does not create an estoppel.
Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
In the case at bar, Charlene testified that she changed
her career and incurred debts to remodel her home based upon her
assumption that she would not be compelled to abide by the terms of
the decree.

As she testified:

Q.
Did Mr. Hinckley's willingness not to
require you to repay that money have anything
to do with that decision?
A.
Certainly. When I figured that he wasn't
going to ask me to pay, why then, I could do
some of the things I wanted to because I knew
I could pay it off over a period of time, if I
had that alimony coming in as kind of a
support system. ...
Q.
Did your sale of the duplex, was that in
any way affected by Mr. Hinckley's decision
not to hold you to those payments?
A.
Well, yes, because I could tack that
money directly on to my remodeling job.
(Transcript 144-145)(emphasis added).
Charlene made her assumption based upon Howard's failure
to press the issue of offset and her interpretation of Dayna's
alleged conversation with Howard, (Transcript 140, 142-143) not
based

upon any conversation

she personally
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had with Howard.

Charlene testified in her affidavit that she and Howard had never
discussed the issue of Howard's right of offset.
The record does not reflect any facts which support the
trial court's finding of waiver and estoppel.

The trial court

erred in denying Howard's prayer for a judgment in the amount of
one-half of Charlene's net income for the years 1981 to 1989 based
upon waiver and/or estoppel.
CONCLUSION
Howard Hinckley respectfully requests this Court to
reverse the decision of the District Court and remand this case for
further proceedings in the matter of his Petition for Modification
and for findings regarding the change of the relative circumstances
of Charlene Hinckley and the ability of Charlene Hinckley to
support herself.
Appellant further requests this Court to reverse the
decision of the District Court with regard to judgment in the
amount of one-half of Charlene Hinckley's net earnings for the
years 1981-1989. and to remand the case with instructions to enter
judgment in favor of Howard Hinckley in the amount of one-half of
the net income of Charlene Hinckley, plus interest.
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